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While legal rules provide necessary protection to scientists on 
one hand, they impose significant restrictions on the other. 
Furthermore, science is governed by its own set of ethical 
rules. Many assumptions about the rules imposed from the out-
side are actually based on the more-or-less intuitive under-
standing of such ethics. This is a hit-and-miss-affair: Some-
times those rules meet, while they may deviate just as often. 
Introduction 
Lawyers and judges often seem to act as direct successors to priests, translat-
ing the utterings of the oracle of Delphi by explaining equally mysterious 
legal rules (Amsterdam, 1970). In contrast, academics serve a different relig-
ion based on other rites but with a similar goal of improving society. Often, 
law seems to provide unnecessary double precautions, as rules of ethical 
research seemingly already offer sufficient protection. Indeed, such interfer-
ence in internal affairs by outsiders is intuitively frowned upon. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that scientists blame legal rules and their implementers for im-
posing unnecessary and annoying limitations on essential academic activities 
(Green, 1992). Because it is easy to shoot the messenger (Shakespeare, 
1598), asking to kill all of the lawyers to achieve utopia is certainly not far-
fetched (Shakespeare, 1623). However, further examination shows that those 
objections go both ways. Scientists complain about both “overregulation” and 
“underregulation” (Sunstein, 1990): What is there is not enough—and still 
too much. 
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This can be easily exemplified by looking at popular beliefs about intel-
lectual property law. One tends to apply a strict perspective against others 
seeking to reuse the data gathered, content created, or inventions made by 
oneself (see the heated debate in the U.S. on granting copyright to the lecturer 
instead of the employing university; Triggs, 2005; Holmes & Levin, 2000; 
Townsend, 2003). In contrast, reuse of content made by others in teaching is 
considered a good practice (see aptly Lessig, 2001). To many scholars, it is 
counterintuitive to lose each and every right to their work when signing a 
publishing contract. Consequently, written agreements with publishers were 
and are often ignored when sending papers to colleagues or even putting 
them on Web sites (before self-archiving clauses became popular). 
The internal system of ethical research practices at universities, in con-
trast, is well established and thoroughly administered by university commit-
tees and even includes written commitments and frameworks, which look and 
feel much like “laws.” Such rules are not limited to research on human or 
animal subjects; they also cover practices such as the attribution of works and 
data or the transparency and reproducibility of research (cf. Hudson et al., 
2005 on an empirical approach to ethics in Internet Research). 
When trying to determine the appropriate external (legal) rules, informal 
internal (ethical) codes of conduct are often confused with actual require-
ments imposed by law (for the lawyer’s perspective, cf. Cohen, 1934). In 
general, ethical means should be allowed without restrictions, whereas uneth-
ical practices should not only be frowned upon by colleagues but also sanc-
tioned by law. However, legal rules and ethical beliefs do not necessarily go 
hand in hand. This may be due to questions still being debated in the scien-
tific community or by the general public but decided by the legislators (e.g., 
stem cell research) or due to legal rules usually not being limited to scientists 
but having to cover a multitude of different cases. 
Ethical rules are not the only guideline applied by laypersons trying to 
conform to legal requirements. Because the law itself is usually inaccessible, 
or at least incomprehensible, to the average researcher, they tend to fill gaps 
with assumptions based on information gathered from unreliable sources, 
including colleagues, public media, or the Internet. Again, this provides a 
broad fertile soil for errors—even though intuition is certainly an appropriate 
approach even in judicial decision-making (Wright, 2006). 
If the applicable law were clear and certain and remained generally un-
changed, then such confusion could be eliminated with mere education or 
information. However, especially with regard to the Internet, law is in a con-
stant state of flux. Copyright cases produce unpredictable results, and funda-
mental differences across the national legal regimes provide an unstable basis 
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for the increasingly international research community (cf. Dellapenna, 2000). 
Indeed, unlike real property and contracts, neither copyright nor privacy law 
(or “data protection” law) is a required subject in the study of law, nor are 
they part of any bar exam. Thus, even most law professors and law students 
can shed little light on these topics. Similarly, it is in the best interest of a 
university’s administrative staff to eliminate any risk of possible liability by 
suggesting the most restrictive approach. 
This paper will examine a few common misconceptions regarding legal 
rules, explain the current legal framework by giving examples from the U.S. 
and Germany, and provide a brief look into current developments. While the 
field is extremely broad, we will focus on copyright and privacy laws as the 
most fundamental issues involved in scientific use of the Internet. 
The Copyright Dilemma 
Copyright is one of the fundamental pillars of research. Specifically, the 
requirement of attribution serves a dual purpose. By prohibiting plagiarism, 
scholars can only acquire a reputation by publishing their own ideas. Fur-
thermore, a good reputation may form a basis for reliance, thus avoiding the 
need to verify information as long as the source is known to do proper re-
search (this is an example of Akerlof’s [1970] “market for lemons”). 
However, the copyright granted to scientific articles is, in most parts, 
identical to the copyright granted to the latest hit single, blockbuster movie, 
or even copy of Microsoft Word running on your computer. Whereas com-
posers, software developers, and movie directors usually seek monetary bene-
fits from their works, scholars generally will not be able to make a living 
from the articles or books they write. In contrast, if only money is at stake, 
there might be a good argument against perpetual property in creative prod-
ucts. If the public has paid enough for the cultural enrichment provided by 
Jurassic Park IV, then it should go into the public domain and be available to 
everyone for free. Attribution of original works, in contrast, should be per-
petual—because the ability to build upon another’s research is essential for 
scientific progress. This simple economic difference is not embraced by the 
legal system, which treats popular and scholarly works largely in an identical 
manner. Similarly, scientific use, as such, is not generally privileged in com-
parison to mere private use. Furthermore, economic reasoning, or even the 
ethical rules of science, does not necessarily lead to a proper assumption of 
what is allowed or what is not allowed in copyright law. 
However, there is also some good news. Unlike many areas of law (in-
cluding privacy law, which we will examine below), copyright law is subject 
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to a rather strict framework of international treaties and conventions, which 
are applied uniformly across most states around the world. Still, differences 
persist, not only in details but also in the fundamental approach to copyright 
cases. This disparity favors the international character of research and is thus 
a useful basis for a framework for science regulation. 
Plagiarism 
Plagiarism has become a heavily debated topic in Germany following the 
discovery that the dissertation thesis of a well-known politician was, in large 
part, copied verbatim from other sources without attribution (on “investiga-
tive crowdsourcing,” cf. PlagDoc & Kotynek, 2012). In the aftermath, uni-
versities invested heavily into both software and personnel to ensure early 
detections of fraudulent dissertations and exams.  
Most cases of plagiarism are not illegal. The law and the ethical rules of 
plagiarism intersect imperfectly (Stearns, 1992). Indeed, our culture loves 
repetition—from re-telling and re-re-telling of popular stories (take a look at 
the Top 10 movies) to copying of designs for household goods (read up on 
the current legal issues between Apple and Samsung). Works may be part of 
the public domain, e.g., with an expired copyright, or the part copied may be 
so tiny as not to constitute an infringement. Indeed, it would impose an all 
but insurmountable challenge on most scholars (and even worse on students) 
to re-create everything independently on their own—reinventing the wheel 
once again would not further science. As scary as the word plagiarism may 
sound (coming from the Latin word plagiarius, referring to kidnappers of 
another’s slaves), it is not beyond possibility that two (great) minds reach the 
same idea and even use the same words to express it. Just coming to identical 
conclusions is no misconduct at all, while rephrasing someone else’s ideas is. 
Copyright law also fails when plagiarism only extends to someone else’s 
research data. There is no legal monopoly on mere facts. Furthermore, reus-
ing my own work without attribution will only be considered a copyright 
infringement if I violate the license agreement I signed with the original pub-
lisher. “Self-plagiarism,” as such, is unknown to the law. 
Although the law largely ignores plagiarism, the academic penalty could 
be no worse—it is “a capital offense, punishable by academic death” (Onge, 
1988). This is especially problematic, as the scope of unwanted practice is 
highly unspecific, and there are no lawyers to resolve questions of interpreta-
tion. While there may indeed be clear-cut cases, especially involving students 
merely copying content from readily available online sources and handing it 
in as their work, things become extremely difficult in professional scientific 
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research. In describing a case of “scientific misconduct,” Daroff (2007) aptly 
states: 
[…] many of the problems we encountered stem from author naivety, sloppiness, 
and the ambiguities involved in plagiarism and self plagiarism. One doesn’t have 
to be a flagrant sociopath to encounter charges of misconduct or breach of ethics. 
(p. 532, f. 3) 
Indeed, it seems that plagiarism is much like pornography—you know it 
when you see it (Stewart, 1964—a comparison discovered by Stearns, 1992). 
The issue of plagiarism is not so much the use of another’s intellectual prop-
erty but the subsequent fraud—basing respect by peers and students not on 
hard work and intelligence but on mere copying. This puts the reputation of 
academia as a whole in question, which is certainly unacceptable. However, 
because detection is slow and imprecise and has a high rate of mistakes, pla-
giarism often comes as a surprise. In contrast, violations of intellectual prop-
erty as such are not always frowned upon by science ethics. For instance, it is 
a good and well-accepted practice to send digital copies of a paper to col-
leagues and friends, even when the publishing contract assigns such rights 
exclusively to the publisher. 
The value of attribution in copyright law has historically been a major 
controversy between the Continental European droit d’auteur and the U.S. 
“copyright” systems. While the European approach is largely based on the 
author’s natural right to his or her creation and, therefore, emphasizes attribu-
tion, U.S. copyright law is more focused on a utilitarian perspective and thus 
does not provide in its rules on fair use a requirement for attribution. Never-
theless, by adopting the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (in 1989!), even the U.S. is required to ensure that every au-
thor has 
the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. (Art. 6 till Sec. 1) 
Nevertheless, lack of proper citations should constitute copyright in-
fringement, even though U.S. law remains silent on the requirement of proper 
attribution. 
Sometimes, offenders try to provide a defense of “good faith plagiarism.” 
One reason often expressed is that the omitted sources are not worthy of a 
citation, as they are not sufficiently “scientific.” Such “non-academic” 
sources may include anything from blog entries, tweets, comments posted in 
a forum, text from Wikipedia, PowerPoint presentations, or lecture materials 
found on the Internet to popular fiction or even texts from a different disci-
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pline. Inversely, authors defend their actions by pointing out that their work 
was not academic, e.g., a mere slide show, some lecture notes passed out to 
students, or a blog entry. The reasoning again does not refer to a legal de-
fense but shows that the ethical standard is highly imprecise. While such a 
close definition of quotable sources is certainly erroneous, the other variant 
of good faith is far more compelling: Every scholar writing a paper (such as 
this one) has certainly read many prior publications, most of them not in 
parallel to writing but beforehand. Unless one has eidetic memory, it is high-
ly unlikely that one will be able to attribute each and every idea to a specific 
paper, especially when many ideas are shared among most authors (and 
might thus be considered “public knowledge”). Still, that defense will not be 
accepted because it would otherwise create a loophole that proves difficult, if 
not impossible, to close. 
The consequences of plagiarism are extremely harsh. From a legal view-
point, it is surprising that even a tiny bit of plagiarism will spoil a complete 
paper, article, or book. While the unattributed contents may only constitute a 
minor part of the actual product (and are often only tangential to the core 
theory presented), evidence of a violation of the rules of good scientific prac-
tices allegedly eliminates any benefits the work might have had for the scien-
tific community. The law might grant damages or (in rare cases) an injunc-
tion preventing distribution of the book in its current form—but it would still 
respect the author’s efforts. Copying only minor parts would almost never 
provide cause for such an injunction. The oft-feared criminal sanctions are 
limited to even more extreme cases (but cf. Green, 2002, who attempts to 
analyze the social rules of plagiarism by comparing them to the requirements 
of the legal rules on theft). 
Occasionally, someone tries to summarize the rules of plagiarism in sim-
ple, clear “Dos” and “Don’ts” (e.g., Gerhardt, 2006). While requiring attribu-
tion of “borrowed content” and asking for “quotation marks” seem simple 
enough, cases of plagiarism are not determined based on the actual behavior 
of the suspected author (which cannot be reproduced) but merely on the writ-
ten results. The aforementioned well-publicized scandal in Germany caused 
many scientists to apply an extremely stringent standard of care in writing 
articles and books. This fear is further enforced by academic organizations, 
universities, and non-governmental organizations, which have designed 
guidelines for scholarly practices that tend to take an extremely strict stance 
on plagiarism. Indeed, overly careful authors on legal faculties (especially 
graduate students) seem to be keener to find references to add to their foot-
notes than to develop innovative theories or conduct their own research. 
Much time is wasted ensuring that everything that might have been said by 
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someone else before is attributed to that person—even if the author did not 
copy that source but merely made a “parallel invention.” It may well be pos-
sible that some authors simply choose not to publish to avoid even the ap-
pearance of unprofessionalism. 
Such over-care is as worrisome as ignorance of the issue. The search for 
plagiarism must not turn into a witch hunt. The core issue seems to be the 
lack of a proper code on what constitutes plagiarism and what does not, as 
well as the lack of a centralized instance to interpret such rules. Furthermore, 
the analysis sadly always happens ex post and is therefore inevitably subject 
to hindsight bias: It seems to be rather easy to find someone who had compa-
rable or even identical theories on a certain subject, but proving that one 
copied from the other is only possible with certainty if the text or large parts 
have been duplicated verbatim. Because only very naïve students (much less 
full-fledged scholars) would go that far, there is a significant margin for error 
in determining plagiarism. Thus, an open debate is inevitable, which should 
mainly be focused on the specific disciplines and not on the science commu-
nity as a whole. A mere technological approach is useless except for detect-
ing the most ignorant of copyists. Generally, preventive measures (such as an 
ongoing dialogue during the writing of a thesis or seminar paper) are prefera-
ble to ex-post sanctions. 
Reuse of Content in Teaching 
In the good old days, everyone bought textbooks and read them. When Xerox 
invented the photocopier (in 1959), teachers (both in schools and universities) 
suddenly had the opportunity to create a specific selection of readings spe-
cifically catering to their lectures. Such “readers” quickly became a popular 
practice, and suddenly students received huge stacks of printed paper to read 
at home. When the Internet became widely accepted, teachers once again 
made use of the medium and “made available” recommended materials for 
download and printing (Lan & Dagley, 1999). And they lived happily ever 
after. 
Sadly, things are never that simple in real life. Supporting self-learning by 
providing students with a broad selection of materials might well be a good 
or even commendable practice from an educational point of view. Indeed, 
even the Berne Convention contains a provision on the specific exceptions 
related to teaching: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special 
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to 
the extent justified by the purpose, of […] works by way of illustration […] for 
teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice. (Article 10) 
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That exception has its roots in the original agreement of 1886. Still, the 
U.S. Copyright Act does not include a specific provision allowing for the 
reuse of protected works in teaching, although it covers such use under the 
general terms of fair use (ALA). EU-Directive 2001/29/EC expressly allows 
for exceptions 
for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as long as 
the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
impossible and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be 
achieved; [and for] making available, for the purpose of research or private study, 
to individual members of the public by dedicated terminals […] of works […] 
contained in their collections. (Article 5) 
The domestic laws implementing these exemptions vary widely 
(Xalabarder, 2009; Xalabarder, 2004; Ernst & Haeusermann, 2004). Fur-
thermore, their wording is surprisingly unspecific, referring to “small parts” 
and “necessity.” Thus, teachers, both in schools and universities, are largely 
left out in the rain. Because actual cases in court are rare, and procedures 
usually take many years, uncertainty prevails. Nevertheless, the number of 
documents made available to students has been on a steady increase. For 
example, the University Library in Düsseldorf currently scans approximately 
5,000 excerpts (mainly from books) on behalf of lecturers for roughly 600 
lectures. These numbers do not take into account documents scanned directly 
by lecturers and their staff, as well as materials taken from online sources and 
converted into PDF—the University’s central e-learning-platform receives 
more than 30,000 new documents per year (which include slides and lecture 
notes created by the professors themselves). Similarly, there is an extremely 
high demand by students for relevant materials beyond PowerPoint slides; in 
a recent survey, more than 80% of the students at the faculty of law giving an 
answer considered the direct availability of such materials as “very im-
portant” for their studies. 
Still, the mist of uncertainty remains—so how do lecturers and university 
or the library administration cope with the risk of infringing on someone’s 
copyright? Discussions with colleagues at Düsseldorf University show that 
the answers seem to be highly dependent on the actual field of research. Sur-
prisingly, teachers at the faculty of law show the least concern and the 
strongest belief that their actions are covered by exceptions to copyright law. 
In contrast, teachers at the medical faculty are very reluctant even to talk 
about the use of content created by others, as there is a strong belief that any 
such reuse would be deemed illegal. In general, most university educators 
assume some kind of liability shield, even though they are unable to specify 
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the scope. Still, the mere belief is sufficient to cause them to provide quite a 
lot of reading to their students. 
The policy conflict underlying content reuse in teaching is evident in 
states in which education is predominantly funded by the government, as in 
Germany (see generally Chon, 2007). Thus, states are required to pay copy-
right owners (or more precisely the privately held publishers) to ensure ap-
propriate means for education. By granting exceptions to such rights, they 
save real cash. In contrast, they also fear that too broad exceptions might be 
detrimental to scientists working in their institutions, as they would be sanc-
tioned by being unable to present their ideas in printed publications. 
German law provides an excellent illustration of the issues involved. Un-
der current law, it is illegal to provide printed copies of another’s text to 
students (apart from exams) or even to send them texts by e-mail (whereas an 
exception allowing such use exists for schools, see 53 Section 3 of UrhG, i.e., 
the German Copyright Law). However, a well-meaning legislator created a 
specific exemption to the act for making short texts or short excerpts availa-
ble to a specific group of students (identified by individual passwords) that 
actually participate (i.e., physically sit) in a course, as long as the provision of 
such texts is “necessary” for the purpose of teaching (see 52a Section 1 of the 
German Copyright Law). The only court decision available assumes that 
neither downloading nor printing the document is “necessary,” as reading it 
online on screen is deemed sufficient. Furthermore, German law requires 
“fair compensation” for any use made; this, in turn, requires universities and 
libraries to take into account any use made as a flat fee agreement being de-
clined by the relevant collection societies. Further limitations are laid down 
in a 2003 “Charter” of the German Library Association and the Publisher’s 
Association (Börsenverein), which excludes the use of any content made 
available on the university network by the publisher itself, imposes a re-
quirement to delete any content as soon as the course ends, limits the content 
to be made available to texts actually used in class (and thus excluding any 
articles meant to allow a student to expand his understanding), and only al-
lows libraries to scan books that are available locally. 
Still, most university professors in Germany make available any texts 
they consider useful. As mentioned before, legal cases are extremely rare and 
are most often filed against the university and not the individual teacher. The 
reason is twofold: Universities provide deeper pockets, and the state or the 
university will be required to indemnify anyone who did not act with “gross 
negligence.” Such extreme lack of care will almost never be provable.     
Although the available texts go beyond the allowed threshold, there is no 
evidence that the introduction of the exception in 2002 has actually caused 
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any loss of income to the relevant publishers (indeed, their profits increased 
by 20%, cf. Bibliotheksverband, 2012). 
As in the case of plagiarism, the law again fails to fulfill the hopes or even 
assumptions of its academic addressees. While the issue of plagiarism is 
simply ignored by law and left to science ethics, the rules allowing lecturers 
to make texts available to their students are unable to provide for useful 
learning experiences. Thus, legal rules would actually limit science in one of 
its core purposes—if scholars knew about those rules and obeyed them.  
Although some professors are evidently concerned about possible violations 
of copyright, many still infringe and hope for the best, or at least for secrecy. 
Indeed, granting students access to important source texts may well be “ethi-
cal,” even though it is still “illegal.” 
Open Access and Creative Commons 
In recent years, the debate on “Open Access” to academic articles has gath-
ered significant impact. This is largely due to some state and private funding 
requiring the publication of results under Open Access licenses. Nevertheless, 
traditional journals not only prevail but even thrive. Open Access is remark-
able in the context of this paper for two reasons. First, its supporters try to 
adapt copyright to fit the needs imposed by academia. Second, they do so by 
creating another framework that sits somewhere between “ethics” and “law.” 
This becomes clear when one examines the licenses discussed for “Open 
Data.” As mentioned before, data as such is not protected by law; neverthe-
less, the proponents of such licenses try to create an enforceable framework 
for their needs. 
Just as many authors never read their publishing agreements, few people 
actually spend the time reading the “legal code” of a Creative Commons 
license. Fewer still know that beyond the “Unported” version, there are in-
deed “ported” versions adapted to the needs of a specific jurisdiction (e.g., 
there is a “CC3.0-BY-DE” containing a version of the Creative Commons 
license adapted to the specific needs of Germany). These go beyond mere 
translation but try to adapt the rules to the requirements of the respective 
copyright laws—thus leading not to a common German Language CC-
Version but requiring German, Austrian, and Swiss versions of each license. 
These “ported” versions take into account the specific requirements of each 
domestic law (e.g., regarding limitations of liability, protection of “non-
creative” databases under the European Union Database Directive, and so 
on). 
Many authors still believe that publishing their work on the Internet 
(whether as part of a blog, a “working paper,” or whatever) without any li-
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cense is sufficient. Others refer to one of the Creative Commons licenses 
available. Still, even with a system as simplified as Creative Commons, mis-
interpretations abound—especially regarding the “NonCommercial”-variants. 
Indeed, publication practice seems to be governed mainly by outside in-
fluences (such as journals requiring new articles not published before) and 
unwritten ethical rules (mainly referring to attribution). While Creative 
Commons Licenses give their users peace of mind and generally perform 
their task extremely well, they suffer from the same issues as copyright law 
itself: Because it has to cover all kinds of works, it goes beyond what is 
needed, while leaving questions specific to academia unanswered. 
The Privacy Debate 
The “right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890), or at least ensure 
that personal data is not made available to everyone else in the world, seems 
quite intuitive at first glance. However, issues arise when one tries to apply 
that rule to real-life situations (see, e.g., Bruckman, 2002, who rejects analo-
gies to practices in traditional media). This specifically relates to research on 
social networks, such as Twitter or Facebook. This is also where intuition 
begins to fail—because users make their information freely available to just 
about anyone, a right to privacy seems illusionary. Similarly, ethics provide 
little certainty or even guidance (Burk, 2008). 
No modern scholar would believe that any data made available on the In-
ternet (and specifically on social networks) are public and thus not subject to 
legal protection. Nevertheless, the Dos and Don’ts regarding the use of such 
data are not only subject to laws but also to an increasing ethical debate. The 
relevant European Union Directive 95/46/EC refers to anonymization of data 
in its recital 26: 
whereas the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in 
such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable; whereas codes of con-
duct within the meaning of Article 27 may be a useful instrument for providing 
guidance as to the ways in which data may be rendered anonymous and retained 
in a form in which identification of the data subject is no longer possible. 
While this sounds fine in theory, we know that “deanonymization” is pos-
sible based on a very small amount of separate identifiers (cf. Ohm, 2010, 
also covering the relevant exceptions in the U.S.). The law remains ignorant 
of this possibility, which may in turn make any publication of data gathered 
on social media (even if much attention is paid to anonymization) possibly 
illegal. For the future, Ohm suggested several possible paths—strictly punish-
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ing those who cause the actual harm, waiting for some (unlikely) technology 
to allow for perfect automatic anonymization or banning any re-identification 
technologies (much like technologies used to circumvent copy protection 
measures). The privately held social network providers have so far been una-
ble to perform their role as gatekeeper and clearinghouse for academic use 
(Livingston, 2011). Still, it would be neither ethical to keep all research data 
secret nor would a potential breach of confidentiality regarding personal data 
be accepted under an ethical framework. Far more practical, yet also largely 
based on assumptions is the analysis by Yakowitz (2011). She correctly em-
phasized the value of research data and the danger of shifting to an “opt-in” 
model in research. Nevertheless, automatic anonymization may work in some 
contexts, but it is certainly impossible, e.g., in Twitter research. Thus, any 
authority or court eventually reviewing data publication would be required to 
apply a balancing test—with uncertain results. 
Trying to resolve the issue in a 12-page paper is certainly impossible. 
Once again, a clear line rule is needed. Balancing tests are impractical in 
everyday social science research. Such rules should be developed and pro-
posed by actual scientists—and not imposed upon them by a regulatory au-
thority. There is a general danger of generalizing the issue to cover related 
interest groups, such as journalists (Scassa, 2010). However, much like the 
current rule, which is based on pre-existing academic practices, a new rule 
should be based on the actual needs of scientists and not exclusively on ex-
ternal policies, as observed in copyright law. 
Summary and Outlook 
Law and ethics are largely independent regimes. Rules of legal interpretation 
fail in determining “ethical” conduct, whereas legal rules will never be able 
to decide fully whether a practice is acceptable in academia. Conflicts be-
tween legal and ethical regimes are difficult to resolve. The issue is further 
emphasized when the legal framework lacks specificity and relevant practical 
experiences in its implementation (cf. Kaplow, 1992). 
Intuition often provides the only, yet uncertain, guideline for determining 
proper scientific conduct. The situation not only causes significant risk for 
researchers and teachers alike, but it also leads to wasteful and often unneces-
sary precautions. A clear and definite framework, which can be interpreted by 
established methods, seems highly desirable. Developing such frameworks 
suffers from collective action problems, as well as divergent legal frame-
works in different countries and diverging ethical standards in different disci-
plines. Nevertheless, such a task is not only in the interest of individual 
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scholars but also in the best interest of legislators and universities. Imposing 
outside rules on the academic process is unlikely to have a positive impact on 
actual practice. 
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